Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Egypt's Revolution: Constitutional Amendments and Strategic Planning

Dear friends,
The purpose of this analysis is to outline the precarious road a revolution must traverse to rid itself of a dictatorship.  Prerequisites to getting on the road include the need for strategic planning, a roadmap and a timetable.  My focus naturally is on Egypt's current state of affairs following the just-concluded voting on the amendments to its 1971 constitution.  However, such prerequisites apply equally to any of the Middle East nations now in a state of rebellion against autocracy and dictatorship, seeking freedom and democracy for its people.
Egypt's 1971 Constitution: the voting saga on its amendments
As reported on March 20 by Neil MacFarquhar in the New York Times: on Sunday, March 19, more than 14.1 million voters, or 77.2 percent, approved the amendments to Egypt's 1971 constitution; 4 million, or 22.8 percent, voted against them.  The turnout of 41 percent among the 45 million eligible voters broke all records for recent elections, according to the Egyptian government.  (In previous elections, a turnout of around four to five million voters, or 10 to 15 percent of the electorate, was the norm, with many voters bussed in by the government and paid for their efforts.)  This week, Egyptian voters overwhelmingly approved the referendum on constitutional changes; the next step is rapid elections, for parliament and the presidency.
The results of the referendum underscore the following key points:
  1. The strength of established political organizations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and the National Democratic Party, that lobbied for a "yes" vote.
  2. The weakness of emerging liberal groups, that lobbied for a "no" vote.
  3. The fact that people now feel that their votes matter, that the voting was free of problems and was not rigged, and that fair and free voting on that scale in Egypt for the first time in its history could and did work.
  4. The hope that this ushers in a new era of democracy in Egypt, an incontrovertible political system where people participate in politics, vote their interests and values, and are secure that their votes count.
  5. The need for liberal groups, moderate Muslims and other mainstream parties to mount an extensive campaign to better link with Egyptian voters.
  6. The disparity in voter makeup between the cities of Cairo and Alexandria which voted mostly "no," and the provinces, which voted mostly "yes."
  7. The secular values that most likely drove the revolution in the big cities, has not quite reached the provinces.
  8. Keeping the young political activists, who helped organize the revolution that toppled Mubarak, off the influential state-run television prevented them from presenting their point of view to the public and convincing voters to hold out for a longer transitional period before any electoral politics.
Supporters of holding the referendum and the "yes" vote emphasized that voting so quickly, less than two months after the revolution, would allow for:
  1. a swift return to civilian rule,
  2. the prevention of chaos,
  3. the return of safety and security to the street,
  4. the return of foreign investors, and
  5. the prevention of further deterioration of the economy.
These supporters, religious organizations and elements of the defunct National Democratic Party, had spread false rumors, suggesting that voting against the referendum would threaten Article 2 of the Constitution, which cites Islamic law as the main basis for Egyptian law.  They also put up signs that said "If you vote no you are a follower of America and ElBaradei, and if you vote yes you are a follower of God," meaning that Muslims would vote "yes" and Copts and atheists would vote "no."
Those who vehemently argued that the referendum should be cancelled or at least postponed until a new constitution is put together by a new parliament and a new civilian President, and then lobbied for a "no" vote - and I am most definitely one of them - had emphasized that:
  1. The 1971 constitution lost its legitimacy with the fall of the Mubarak regime.  The Supreme Military Council’s decision to apply a few amendments to it, is tantamount to denying the 25 January revolution its thoroughly-earned and richly-deserved new constitution.
  2. Even with the proposed amendments rendering the 1971 constitution temporary by obliging the coming president and parliament to call for drafting of a new constitution within six months, their loose linguistic formulation leaves room for interpretation of whether it actually mandates drafting a new constitution.
  3. The president’s constitutional privileges have not been touched, including the power to unconditionally dissolve the parliament. If the answer to this objection is that it is a temporary constitution, then why propose amendments to so few articles?
  4. The amendments retain the current deformed system of government that does not guarantee any real separation of power.
  5. Proposed amendments introduce disparity in parliament (5 years) and presidential (4 years) terms.
  6. The amendment that disqualifies a presidential candidate who has married a non-Egyptian pointedly targets ElBaradei, who is married to an Iranian.
  7. A proposed amendment obliges the president to appoint a vice-president.  If Egypt is to be governed by a presidential system of government, then the vice-president has to be elected with the president.
  8. A proposed amendment puts the council of ministers - appointed by the president - in charge of approving the president’s demand to amend the constitution, which puts an entity appointed by the president as the adjudicator of his decisions, adding to the confusion regarding the authority of the president.
  9. Proposed amendments do not give women the right to run for the presidency.
  10. Voting on the amendments at this time does not allow for Egyptians abroad, estimated at 7 to 10 million, to cast their votes.
Many prominent Egyptians, including reform advocate Mohamed ElBaradei, retired Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, both planning to run for president, have stood against any constitutional amendments and have called instead for a declaration of constitutional principles to govern the interim period leading to the drafting of a new constitution.  It is noteworthy that Mr. ElBaradei was attacked by a mob when he went to cast his ballot, fleeing a shower of rocks and bottles that broke all of his car windows and effectively prevented him from voting.  His supporters said the mob was paid.
Egypt's road ahead: strategic planning, a roadmap and a timetable - for the 25 January revolution not to become a missed opportunity
As regards the voting outcome, a friend of mine wrote "First time in history I hear of a nascent, pure and noble revolution contesting its diabolic enemies in a political arena they control 1000%.  Well, but let's not forget that this is Egypt, the eternal land of paradox. Lord Milnes mentioned this in his book about Egypt back in 1907 and it still stands fresh today."
"Please protect the revolution, there is a systematical counter revolution going on," said PM Essam Sharaf in a TV interview.
"A bigger revolution will happen in Egypt in 11 months," predicted an American journalist.
“The results of the referendum make me worried about Egypt’s political future,” Mr. Ahmed Maher, political activist, said, vowing to redouble his efforts to get out onto the streets to organize before the elections.  He added, “The interference of religion in politics can destroy Egypt.”
I believe that revolutionary Egyptians, the leaders of the movement behind the revolution, political activists, prominent figures like ElBaradei and Moussa, should all vow never to give up.  They should never forget that the Egyptian people, against all odds and contrary to all analyses of who they are, were capable of January 25.  I believe they are eminently capable of more miraculous acts in their future.  I for one would not rule out another amazing movement that would confront the regime on even terms.
Let us not forget that the regime is made of people and not supermen, and yes they had a head start of 60 years; but if the Egyptian people were to intelligently move fast, efficiently use the tools and means at their disposal and focus intently, they can in short order effectively deal with the regime, thus securing a positive outcome and an irreversible forward movement for Egypt.
The spirit of the 25 January revolution demands a belief in the collective effectiveness of the movement for democracy, and not fearing the unknown and resorting to half solutions.
Unquestionably the burden is on the Egyptian revolutionaries.  They must figure out their immediate next steps.  This coming period is short yet decisive as regards the formation of new political parties and paving the road for the democratic practice of political rights.  They must provide for a healthy atmosphere that will facilitate open discussions and deliberations to produce the best alternatives and to avoid surrendering to trade-offs.  I will discuss below the critically needed strategy, plan, roadmap and timetable to navigate this coming period.  Important to note that the discussion is relevant to similar movements all across the Middle East regardless of diverse circumstances.
Strategic Planning
Egypt's revolutionary people, revolution leaders and activists, need to shift their attention to dealing with the complexity of the social equation prevailing in Egypt today, a military that may very well see its best chances of maintaining control of the country in all of its aspects is with an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, 100s of thousands of members of Mubarak's defunct National Democratic Party working to safeguard their gains and vying to keep a healthy presence in any new parliament and a host of special interest groups, hundreds of officers from State Security, tens of thousands of members of local councils, governors, university presidents and deans of colleges appointed by State Security, media and corporate leaders and heads of factories and trade unions, all in all thousands upon thousands of the Mubarak regime who may see the security of their future in maintaining the Mubarak regime without Mubarak, with cosmetic changes to the constitution, with some tweaking of government, parliament and a new form and face for the presidency.
To be effective, the revolutionaries will now have to embark on a careful planning and preparation process.  They will need to understand what is required of them, secure necessary resources, and devise effective strategies.  Following are the key areas to be covered in the process of strategic planning.
Questions to be answered
In order to put together a viable and implementable strategic plan, answers are required as regards:
  1. The main obstacles to achieving desired objectives.
  2. The factors that will facilitate achieving those objectives.
  3. The main strengths and weaknesses of the groups currently running the show.
  4. The groups in power, their sources of power and their vulnerabilities.
  5. The strengths and weaknesses of the revolutionary movement.
  6. The status of other groups in the country currently not involved, and the likelihood that their assistance could be secured.
A plan
A plan that clearly defines the roadmap and associated timetable should be devised to address:
  1. Tactical small steps to be taken to achieve the overall objective of a secular state, with a new constitution; a representative, independent and competent parliament; a competent and dare I say minimally corrupt government; and above all a civilian president who is highly qualified and in possession of a solid character.
  2. Economic issues to be emphasized to the Egyptian public.
  3. Enlightened leadership structure to be instituted across the nation.
  4. Communication vehicles to be deployed.
  5. Social, educational, economic and political activities to be pursued in the short and long term.
  6. External assistance to be sought.
  7. Foreign diplomatic and defense policies, priorities and initiatives to be pursued.
New Methods of Action
Today, March 23, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announced that it is criminalizing protests and that organizers of demonstrations will now face jail sentences and/or stiff fines if they try to organize protests along the lines of the democratic uprising we saw in Cairo and the rest of Egypt starting on January 25.  While there could be no nobler cause for a people than to seek freedom and democracy, revolutionaries have now to carefully balance risks and gains when considering mass protests, demonstrations, marches and other nonviolent disruptions, such as sit-ins, stand-ins, obstructions and other assemblies of protest.  It is time to also consider other nonviolent outreach methods, and deploy them if feasible.  It is best to use a considerable amount of these methods to affect the potentially revolution-derailing situation, focusing the appropriate method to the issue at stake to secure the desirable outcome.  The key is to carefully choose the methods and stubbornly apply them on a wide scale.  These methods must be managed by competent people who understand how to use particular tactics within an overall strategy.  These methods could include:
  1. Public speeches, letters of opposition or support, declarations by organizations and institutions, group and mass petitions, signed public statements, etc..Communications with as wide an audience as possible, television, radio, Internet, newspapers and magazines, leaflets and pamphlets, banners and posters, etc.
  2. Group lobbying.
  3. Symbolic public acts, display of message-laden portraits, wearing of symbols, symbolic sounds, etc.
  4. Pressures on influential officials and individuals in decision-making positions
  5. Use of drama and music, humorous skits and pranks, performance of plays, songs, etc.
Constitution drafting
Since preparing a new constitution takes considerable time and thought, the revolutionaries should start now to draft the key components of a new constitution for Egypt.  This way, they will be ready to introduce, argue, influence, defend and compromise to secure a new constitution worthy of their noble and heroic efforts of 25 January.
Egypt's new constitution should define:
  1. The purpose of the democratic government.
  2. The limits on government powers.
  3. The means and timing of elections at all levels of government and legislation.
  4.  Inherent human and civil rights.
  5. The relation of the national government to other lower levels of government.
  6. The division of authority among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
  7. The delineation of governing responsibility among central, provincial, and local governments.
  8. The specific and precise responsibilities and legal activities of police, intelligence and military services.
In discussing and debating the new constitution, revolutionary leaders should emphasize that the new constitution should ensure a democratic government that guarantees the rights of each and every individual, every Egyptian citizen, regardless of religion and gender.  It should also be constructed of wording that is easily understood by the majority of the population.  It should not complex or ambiguous so that it requires lawyers or other elites to decipher or interpret it.
The military, the Muslim Brotherhood and the defunct National Democratic Party
The identification of the sources of the political power of above-noted entities is a must.  Where they get their authority, their human resources, their skilled and knowledgeable cooperating persons and groups, what psychological and ideological ways they use to influence and secure people's allegiance, what material resources (physical and financial assets, communication and transportation means), what punishments they can dish out and threats they can deliver on.
Internal support, particularly from WOMEN
Top priority should be given to contacting and lobbying all possible groups and institutions, weak or under-developed as they may be.  These may include powerful families, moderate religious groups, trade unions, student associations, sport clubs, cultural, literal and musical societies, villages and neighborhood communities, human rights organizations, and others, with particular attention to WOMEN.
Of the utmost import is to reach out to women's groups, prominent women and women in general.  Women in Egypt are the one segment of the population that stand to lose or gain the most.  Without a secular, progressive, moderate and modern Egypt emerging at the end of this colossal process underway, women in Egypt will continue indefinitely to be regarded as second-class citizens with all the associated negative, unjust and simply wrong connotations.  To underscore the grave plight of Egyptian women, Amnesty International reported today that about 18 protesters detained on March 9, during the Million Women March that fizzled to a couple of hundred, were stripped naked by military interrogators and subjected to a virginity test.
Let us never forget that without Egyptian women's full participation in all aspects of life in Egypt, and it is their choice as to how to participate, Egypt is doomed, with not a chance for progress.
Egyptians abroad
Great efforts must be made to secure the right of Egyptian citizens living abroad to vote in any and all elections.  It is an indispensable resource for interjecting into Egyptian politics the modern world view.  Egyptians abroad, estimated anywhere from 7 to 10 million in number, could play an integral role in launching forward a moderate and modern Egypt, a nation capable of providing for its citizens the necessary tools and opportunities to progress towards freedom and a respectable and dignified standard of living.
External Assistance
As romantic as going it alone sounds, some foreign assistance may be required here.  Efforts must be made to mobilize world opinion in favor of revolution objectives.  It is no shame to dispute the Egyptian military contention that it alone would secure stability in Egypt and thus the Middle East.  Strategic planning for the period ahead requires approaching concerned external parties to secure their moral assistance.  And yes, the United States should be one of these nations to be approached, seriously and vigorously.  The US holds many Middle East political cards and the revolutionaries need to neutralize it so that it is not taking a position on the result of free and fair elections.  To secure its support, they need to emphatically argue that it is in the long-term interest of the US to stand behind fundamental change in Egypt, a change for true freedom, human rights, democracy and a secular state.  They need to argue that 60 years of military rule of Egypt, the legitimacy of its system, has been thoroughly discredited as evidenced by the degree of corruption and incompetency rampant in the country today.  They need to approach US Secretary of State Clinton, for extensive and in-depth dialogue, and they need to do it soon, she is retiring to focus on being a grandma at the end of Obama's first term!
Let us not forget the big picture, the ultimate goal, a free, secular, democratic and progressive Egypt.  All means should be pursued to achieve this goal.  When, a few years from now, a strong Egypt emerges, then and only then will it be in a position to deal with US and the rest of the modern world on favorable terms.
In conclusion, the referendum voting is behind us, elections, a new government and a new constitution is before us, Egypt revolutionary leaders and activists must not waste a minute preparing for the upcoming months.  Above, I tried to outline the way forward for such preparation.  It is possible to develop an appropriate strategic plan, but it most definitely will require vigilance, hard work, and without a question discipline and unwavering focus.
Hussein


© Hussein A Amin 2011