Egypt, the Middle East, and Elsewhere: Military Regime and Development in Egypt

Dear friends,

Egypt had a small window of opportunity back in February. By the appointment of a civilian presidential council of 3-5 prominent civilians to manage the transition period, it would have begun the process of ridding itself of the exceedingly harmful and devastating longtime mindset that the only regime capable or permitted to govern is one that emanates from the military, a military regime.

Unfortunately, the political machinery and organization to have made that possible was nowhere to be found. How could it be, with decades of an autocratic regime? The United States could have helped in that regard, with its great involvement and national security interests in that region. But, alas, Obama failed to capitalize on the historic opportunity that presented itself on January 25. His first response was laudable. Then, Obama started listening to politicians, generals, national security advisers, diplomats, pundits, lobbyists, business leaders, etc. and blew a once-in-lifetime opportunity for him to don the great history leaders' mantle. If Obama were a great leader, he would have trusted his first instinct and known that these people talking into his ears were small people when it comes to global leadership and a sense of destiny and history. The main reason they are small is that they think win-lose, they think short term, and they do not think big picture. I would gladly leave it to history to prove me wrong.

If Obama had supported the 25 January revolution's basic demand for the whole of Mubarak's regime to go, and that demand had been met, history would have been made. Not only this would have been great for Obama, but the US may have gained major momentum with regard to the hearts and minds of the Arab world, the Muslim world and indeed the whole world. It could have ushered in a brand new era in the Middle East. Instead, Obama opted to support the military taking over from Mubarak, the current Supreme Military Council now in charge in Egypt.

Ironically, this particular hope and worry regarding Obama's response and actions following the 25 January revolution was the catalyst behind my starting to write my analyses, nineteen and counting with this one. See my first blog entry "Egypt, Obama and History."

Enough blaming Obama for Egypt's state of affairs today and enough expecting Obama to be one of these once-in-lifetime great world leaders, it is simply futile, it is counterproductive to expect it. The ONLY action that should be taken is for the 25 January revolution not to rest until a military regime in Egypt is no more.

Now, the risk of a military-controlled government, a de facto military regime, emerging yet again at the end of upcoming September and November, 2011 elections is clear and real, but it is not a certainty, not yet. However, it is not a conspiracy theory either, mainly because it is convenient for all concerned to have a military regime reigning in Egypt, a military-controlled government enduring in Egypt. Why convenient? simply because it keeps the comfortable (nationally and internationally) and calm (albeit superficially!) status quo, it does not challenge the prevailing state of affairs in Egypt and for Egypt and the rest of the world community, it does not ask for change. Change, for a nation or an individual, while generally a norm, or necessary and unavoidable at times, is unpleasant, difficult and unsettling.

But, is a military regime the inevitable outcome of the 25 January glorious revolution? My fervent hope and my dreams wish not. Let us examine why such an outcome would be a devastating blow to Egypt's chances for progressive and sustainable development and all the benefits that would accrue from it for the Egyptian people.

Below is my analysis of why a military regime is a clear and present danger for Egypt's future. A military-controlled government has no chance of a fundamental success in moving Egypt forward, dealing with Egypt's myriad of issues and needs.

Military Regimes

History is replete with the failure, dictatorship, corruption, poverty and misery brought onto people by military regimes across the globe, in Latin America, in South Asia, in East Asia, in Europe, in Africa, in the Middle East, everywhere.

Military Governments

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, Comparative Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Oct., 1975), pp. 1-30, "Military government, as is evident from the name, refers to the administration of a country by the military. Such a government may be formed when a country conquers another country and establishes a military government or after an internal take-over of power by the military through a coup d'etat. While such governments are a rarity in developed countries, they are quite common in the third world countries. This paper takes a brief look at the major strengths and weaknesses of military governments. The basic role of the military is the defense of a country's borders and to protect it from foreign aggression. It is generally expected to operate under the control of the civilian government. However, in a number of third world countries with no established tradition of civilian or democratic rule, the military acquires a lot of muscle and begins to harbor political ambitions. Due to strict discipline and a hierarchical administrative structure, the military organization is often contemptuous.

"Weaknesses

"Can become corrupted by absolute power.
"Can lose the support of the public by overuse of force, brutality, torture, disappearances and other coercive methods.
"Not accustomed to governing people, a process of a different mind set.
"Can lose legitimacy in the eyes of the world community.
"They are often unsuccessful in addressing the critical issues that made a military government necessary in the first place, which is a common happening even the most benign intentions of a Military Government eventually."

"Strengths

"The control of an enormous coercive apparatus that is trained in the use of force.
"They can, not always but always at great price, provide some degree of stability and social and civil order.
"Often, in many countries, the military is the only public institution that really works, so they can target problems and bring some degree of resolution to them."

Military Regimes and Democracy

R J May, Stephanie Lawson, and Viberto Selochan, in an article written for the Australian National University comparing military rule to democracy, say this about military rule: "Numerous commentators on the role of the military in politics have observed the tendency of armed forces to justify their intervention in terms of the national interest, and thereby to identify themselves with the desiderata of nationhood. Most have been sceptical. Lissak (1976:20), for example, notes that the military can acquire a self image as guarantor of the fundamental and permanent interests of the nation, thereby arrogating to itself the requisite legitimacy to assume the right to rule. Similarly, Nordlinger (1970:1137-8) highlights the manner in which the military’s corporate interests can be defined, legitimised, and rationalised by a close identification with the interests of the nation, while at the same time portraying oppositional protests to their actions as ‘expressions of partial and selfish interests’.

"To legitimise their intervention, military regimes commonly contend that their rule is only a preparatory or transitory (but entirely necessary) stage along the road to a fully democratic political system, and promise an early return to civilian rule, thereby recognising, Dahl (1989:2) argues, that ‘an indispensable ingredient for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy’. In some cases, military rule has been justified ‘as necessary for the regeneration of the polity to allow for stable and effective rule’; military regimes have even portrayed their role as that of ‘democratic tutor’ (Huntington 1968; Nordlinger 1977:204-5). Yet once out of the barracks military rulers have seldom been anxious to relinquish power and even where there have been transitions back to civilian rule the armed forces have typically retained an involvement in politics and have been more likely to intervene again if dissatisfied with the performance of civilian governments."

There is no doubt that a well-intentioned military defends the military interests of the nation, but it does not have the capability to rule that nation, with all the non-military aspects involved in civilian life and the development of that nation, any more than the nation's educational system would have the skills to handle that nation's military needs - it's an entirely different skill set. The military handles one facet of the running of the nation, and should not be expected to handle any non-military functions.

Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition

World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Oct., 1980), pp. 96-120, "Recent literature demonstrates that modern military regimes are actually military-civilian coalitions. The old dichotomy of civil/military is no longer a useful explanation for the politics and the dynamics of military regimes. Role expansion, new professionalism, and mission orientation have changed military missions, doctrines, and self-perception. The author proposes and develops a comparative analysis and a typology of contemporary military regimes: cooperative; market-bureaucratic; socialist-oligarchic; personal tyrannies; and army-party. Case studies include Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. His conclusion, based on the literature, is that military regimes have not succeeded ... in reforming, modernizing, and developing their respective societies despite organizational, structural, and personal commitments to development and reform."

Lehigh University's Henri J. Barkey argues that in industrializing democratic (or semi democratic) societies, where military interventions have been viewed as solutions to increasingly complex economic and political problems, the return to civilian rule is a frustrating experience for the military leaders. Even under the best of circumstances-when soldiers withdraw willingly-the transition process rarely produces the results desired by the military. The shortcomings of the transition are embedded in the dynamics of the process, which include the officers' own miscalculations and, more importantly, civilians' need to demonstrate independence and resistance. This article demonstrates the perils of transition in the case of post-1980 Turkey, where the military undertook a well-planned and thought-out process of disengagement under very favorable conditions. There was almost no civil military conflict or opposition from external sources. Yet the final outcome disappointed the generals.

Military in the Developed World

Military in the secular democratic world from East to West, North to South, is only one of the major institutions in a nation, it is under civilian control. Its main reason for existence is to defend against foreign and domestic enemies. It is there to serve the governments strategies and policies for national security. Its commander-in-chief is the country's president or its prime minister. If military persons once done with their service wish to enter politics, they do so by competing like any other citizen, relying on their qualification, talent and skill. They are not given these jobs.

Civilian control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the civilian political leadership, rather than professional military officers. Samuel P. Huntington's writes in The Soldier and the State that "civilian control ideal is the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority."

Civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. One example is the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Communist Party of China (and communist parties in general) as decision-makers in Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theories of democratic centralism.

Newsweek's first-ever "Best Countries Study," special issue, August 23&30, 2010 provided an overall list of the world's top 100 countries. The list like any list is not perfect but it tells some important things about the world. In Newsweek's overall ranking of the world's best countries, there are no states in the top 50 that are controlled by a military regime. The 50 countries have different forms of government, their military is an integral institution prominently represented in the government and the executive branch, held in high regard and exerting the influence expected from it as the defender of national security.

The study also characterizes the very best of nations as follows:

Finland, best overall
Australia, best medium-sized nation
Japan, best large nation
Albania, best low-income nation
Poland, best upper-middle-income
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Japan, best education
Tunisia, China, Chile, Switzerland, Spain, Australia, best health care
Norway, Ukraine, Cuba, Australia, Germany, best quality of life
Singapore, China, Malaysia, South Korea, United States, best economic dynamism
Sweden, Ghana, Poland, Australia, Germany, best political environment.

One cannot help but note that among these nations not a single one is controlled by a military regime.

Here is the link for the study:

http://www.newsweek.com/feature/2010/the-world-s-best-countries.html

Military Regime and Development in Egypt

Egypt's political, economic and social development needs are well documented in Egypt and internationally in many books, studies, and other writings. What I present here is a concise outline of an action plan that would go a long way to address these needs.

Political Development: the Constitution

The first step in addressing these needs is to prepare a new constitution, the mission statement of the new Egypt. Required components include:

The mission or purpose of the secular democratic government.
The rule of law.
The limits on government powers.
The means and timing of elections at all levels of government and legislation.
Inherent human and civil rights.
The delineation of governing responsibility among central, provincial, and local governments and the relation of the national government to other lower levels of government.
The division of authority among the legislative, executive and judicial functions or branches of government.
The specific and precise responsibilities and legal activities of police, intelligence and military services.

In discussing and debating the new constitution, it should be emphasized that it should ensure a secular democratic government that guarantees the rights of each and every individual, every Egyptian citizen, regardless of religion and gender. It should also be worded so that it is easily understood by the majority of the population. It should not be complex or ambiguous so that it requires lawyers or other elites to decipher or interpret it. Particular emphasis should be on:

Article 2 of the current constitution, amending it to indicate that while Islam is the religion of the vast majority of the people, all faiths are welcome in Egypt. Sharia law is but one source of legislation, taken from as appropriate and pertinent to the 21st century. Arabic is the language of the state.
Free and fair elections, whose independence from interested parties must be assured.
The right of women to run for the presidency.
The right of non-Muslims to run for the presidency.
Decision-making power resides with term-limited elected head of government.
Law-making power resides with term-limited elected legislators.
The citizen's right to change his faith without restriction.
Freedom of expression and the right to dissent and to demonstrate.
The President, Prime Minister and the Ministers are subject to the rule of law and, if accused, may be tried before civilian courts.
Impeachment and trial conditions for the President.
Election of province governors, city mayors, local officials, village chiefs, etc.
Democratic process for amending the constitution.
Foreigners' legal rights as regards use of land, property, etc.
The outlawing of the use of religion in politics, i.e., separation of mosque and state.
Freedom of association and organization.
The binding of Egypt by international conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The military is the protector of the civilian state and will be directed by that civilian state to carry out military objectives deemed necessary by that civilian state to protect Egypt from attack.
The role of the state in managing economic activity and control of markets.
The establishment of a robust civil society to challenge stifling bureaucracies, and ensure respect for the rights of citizens.
The establishment of the independence and framework of Egypt's judiciary system.
Political participation, citizens' engagement in political processes.
Strengthening legitimate institutions and governance for citizen security, justice and jobs.

Political Development: Other Goals

The next step is to devise a viable and implementable strategic plan and associated timetable, to address the following political development goals:

A secular state.
A representative, independent and competent parliament.
A competent and dare I say minimally corrupt government.
Above all, a civilian president who is highly qualified and in possession of a solid character.
Economic issues to be emphasized to the Egyptian public.
Enlightened leadership structure to be instituted across the nation.
Communication mechanisms to be deployed.
Social, educational, economic and political activities to be pursued in the short and long term.
External assistance to be sought.
Foreign diplomatic and defense policies, priorities and initiatives to be pursued.

Economic Development Goals

These economic development goals must be addressed as well:

Productive growth in GDP per capita.
Diversification through research and development, science and technology, moving away from heavy reliance on agriculture and/or natural resources.
Innovation and investment in knowledge-building efforts.
Business vitality, speeding the process of and opening the market to new business entrants, and ease of doing business.
Stock market capitalization, enhancing the size and breadth of a Egypt’s corporate sector.
Job creation and improvement of productivity.
Better integration with the global economy, opening Egypt to importing know-how, technology, manufacturing and logistics systems, whether through foreign investment, licensing, or other business ties to overcome insularity.
Cutting red tape, speeding licensing approvals.

Social Development Goals

... and these goals for social development.

Separation of mosque and state.
Establishment of freedom of the press.
Establishment of women's equality.
Establishment of Copts' equality.
Establishment of equality under law.
Development of education system, general knowledge, training programs and the nation's overall literacy rate. In Egypt, some 30 million are illiterate.
Development of a skilled work force.
Improve overall efficacy of health system.
Drastically reduce nepotism, cronyism and corruption, replacing them with meritocracy, competency and competition.
Improve quality of life, including:

reduce disparity in family income.
reduce unemployment rate.
reduce extreme poverty. In Egypt, 40 per cent of the total population live on less than $2 a day.
improve standard of living, and the availability of basic goods and services.
improve physical environment, address drugs and crime, improve environmental health (air/water pollution and disease, as measured by the Environmental Performance Index).

Egypt's Military Regime, 1952-

Egypt has been under a military regime since 1952. It has been under one form or another of a state of emergency since. Civilian politicians, technocrats and businessmen have always been portrayed as corrupt and ineffective. One form or another of military government have led Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) - a single powerful person, who presided over an autocracy and became the face of Egypt nationally and internationally.

The great irony is that the military regime in Egypt succeeded in accentuating the problems of political development with which the civilian regimes of pre-1952 were initially faced with, and they deprive the would-be civilian politicians of the opportunity to acquire much needed political skills, thus perpetuating the chain of political underdevelopment.

Egypt is at considerable and highly plausible risk for its military regime to continue uninterrupted in spite of the planned parliamentary elections of September, 2011 and presidential election of November, 2011. The reason is simple: the military may find it self-servingly beneficial to retain the right to intervene to resolve political, economic or social crises. Therefore, no non-military elected government will be safe from a future coup. The military will remain as an ever-present reminder to any future government that it is not really in control of anything that matters. Moreover, if the military continues to be the most powerful institution in the country, or de facto the only viable institution, it will influence policy and will only increase its huge economic interests, thus would have the most to lose from meaningful political change.

In light of above critical political, economic and social development needs, needs that must be urgently, decisively and competently addressed... if the military regime prevails, Egypt's is doomed. The main reason for this assertion is that a military regime in Egypt presents the country with the weaknesses and reasons of failure of military regimes across history, as outlined above, as well as the following issues and concerns:

Political

The Mubarak military regime's two main (and linked) objectives were: to stay in power, and self-enrichment. Accountability to the people was not on the agenda, thus protecting Mubarak's many governments from the severe consequences that resulted from its failures.
Military-controlled governments, even with civilian ministers, chronically do not perform anywhere near meeting expectations. The incentive, motivation and the sense of potential achievement simply are not there, they cannot be there, not with the knowledge that they could be out of the government at a moment's notice, that their jobs are temporary and that under a military regime creativity, innovation and risk-taking are not valued or welcome. Basically, such governments are managing the paralyzing bureaucracy, they most assuredly are not there to affect change. Ministers who would propose a change of national policies that may disrupt the status quo, or undermine the authority of the military, or upset an element of society or a particular group in favor with the military, would be asked to resign, without any regard to the merit of their proposals. No gain with superb performance, and no loss with unsatisfactory one.
Egypt's military regime never gained legitimacy. It has always been based on fraudulent elections, elections that are not free or competitive, elections with predetermined outcomes, a former military officer becoming the President, the head of the parliament and with far-reaching dictatorial-like powers.
Military regimes are fundamentally undemocratic. Military culture requires and relies on a strict hierarchy and an effective way to punish any act of insubordination. Democracy, by contrast, requires self-expression and the questioning of authority, and must give the electorate the option of electing non-military-backed candidates to office. Egypt under a military regime since 1952 has never had democracy.

Economic

Egypt's military regime has consistently chosen policymakers based on their political contribution to the regime’s survival, a fact that has Egypt circling the drain of development for more than half a century. Understanding of the requirements for economic development was not the objective in choosing economic policies - political expediency was.
Focus of a military is not on development. Over six decades, the military regime has been incapable of furthering socio-economic development in Egypt, and their performance in the field of political development is even more dismal.

Social

Egyptian people will find it hard to accept the same approach to governing and management of its state affairs following the 25 January revolution. For peaceful, non-aggressive and non-violent people, they made a bold move, they basically etched in the heavens the words: stop this, we cannot take it anymore, enough is enough!
A military regime is authoritarian, accountability to civilians' needs is not required and competency is not a factor.
The main competency of the military is in operational rather than strategic thinking.
Control and calm in the street is the goal of the military, not social progress, and not prosperity.
Political, economic and social progress that could adversely affect military influence on national policy and its economic interests present significant risk for the military regime.
With this military regime, patronage system has been the norm, and with patronage comes incompetency, irresponsibility, ineffectiveness, etc.
Status quo and stagnation are always welcome in a military regime.
It is highly unrealistic to expect the military to give up 60 years of complete control, influence and profiting across the board.

It is also extremely important to point out that the military has been in charge of Egypt since 1952, prompting this simple question: where was the military regime, its President, its government, its leadership, its parliament, its know-how when (not a complete list):

Poverty in Egypt reached an unimaginable level considering Egypt's national resources and wealth. Today, 40+ per cent of the total population live on less than $2 a day.
The education system plummeted to an unacceptable level for any country. Today, some 30 million Egyptians are illiterate (35% of all Egyptians, and 45% of Egyptian women can't read.)
The press completely lost its freedom and with it its objectivity, denying Egypt a healthy and much-needed national dialogue.
80% of women were hidden behind veils and burkas, sending themselves into early and permanent retirement and depriving Egypt of the creativity and productivity of half its citizens.
Coptic Christians were harassed and bullied suffered the indignity of seeing their homes, their churches and their belongings destroyed, burned and ransacked, all when they are as much citizens of Egypt as anyone else.
Rule of law all but disappeared, people harassed, treated with brutality, tortured, losing their jobs, their families living in fear, arrested and thrown in jail without due process.
Food riots erupted. First, the "Bread Riots" of 1977 which affected most major cities from January 18-19. The riots were about the termination of state subsidies on basic foodstuffs. As many as seventy-nine people were killed and 800 wounded in the protests, which ended only with the deployment of the army and the re-institution of the subsidies. Please note the role of the military regime here, it is not in working to alleviate and improve the conditions that would cause such riots. Then on April 8 2008 in Mahallah el-Kobra, the government rushed to grant bonuses to workers after two days of deadly riots over high food prices and low wages.
National budgets were grossly mismanaged, and the nation's wealth siphoned away.
Villages throughout Egypt went for decades without potable water. Countrymen and countrywomen ate food contaminated with carcinogens, and drank water contaminated with sewage, destroying their health.
Corruption, bribery and favoritism, ten times what was there during the monarchy - overthrown for exactly these reasons - went unchecked.
The people clung to the most oppressive practices of traditional society, driving Egypt further into backwardness.
Unemployment today, particularly among the youth, is at an all-time high. A quarter of men and three-fifths of women are jobless. According to a BBC report, 700,000 university graduates chase 200,000 available jobs.

Also worth asking, where was the military since the 25 January revolution, its President, its government, its leadership, its parliament, its know-how when:

At the outset of the 25 January revolution, people needed the military by their side, to no avail.
On January 28, police killed over 200 under the watch of military units purported to have been supplying police with more ammunition.
On 31 January, a military jet flew over Tahrir Square, scaring and intimidating.
On February 2, thugs on camels were unleashed on civilians in Tahrir Square.
Also on February 2, Molotov cocktails rained down on people in the Square from specific buildings/floors for three hours at night and three hours at dawn.
Calls for help were loud and clear from people being attacked by thugs for days before Mubarak stepped down on Feb. 11.
On March 23, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announced that it was criminalizing protests and that organizers of demonstrations would now face jail sentences and/or stiff fines if they tried to organize protests along the lines of the democratic uprising we saw in Cairo and the rest of Egypt starting on January 25.
On April 8, their fellow army officers could have used their support when they joined the people in Tahrir Square asking for the full implementation of the original demands of the 25 January revolution.
In May, civil violence seen over the past few weeks reached a dangerous level with the Salafists burning churches and attacking Copts in Cairo, foreshadowing far worse to come.
Egypt is running out of food, and, more gradually, running out of money with which to buy it. The most populous country in the Arab world shows all the symptoms of national bankruptcy ("The hunger to come in Egypt," Spengler, Asia Times Online, May 10, 2011).

End Result

Even if one were to suspend reality and facts of the last 58+ years, it is real hard to imagine, to envision Egypt's military regime having the intention, the competency, the skills and the capacity to strategize, plan, administer and manage the various national programs and projects, public or private, to affect timely and desirable outcomes.

This analysis shows that military regimes bring many crippling weaknesses to the table, and Egypt's own decades-long military regime has generated a plethora of issues and concerns, a track record of the worst kind. With that in focus, it is impossible to fathom the military accepting the responsibility and be accountable as regards these long-sought-after outcomes, not to mention having them as direct and absolutely necessary national priorities, particularly as it most certainly will challenge and call into question the military's gigantic interests and gains over more than half a century.

Simply put, Egypt's military will never have the focus, the desire, the intent, the drive and energy to deliver on above political, economic and social dire needs, achieving in the process a modern Egypt, an Egypt that would stand tall and proud among 21st century developed nations.

The Transition to Civilian Rule

Jason Erb, in an article in the Huffington Post, warned way back in February: "The supreme military council that now directly rules Egypt has been unequivocal in its desire to hand the day-to-day administration of state affairs back to a civilian government... The question of how this transformation will occur is of the utmost importance. Will this regime continue to exercises [sic] power behind a newly woven curtain of civilian rule hastily installed before sound democratic processes and institutions can be established, or actually take the necessary steps to develop a functioning democratic regime. More importantly, will Egyptians return to their habit of passive cooperation with the regime, or are they prepared to force real change for real democratic reform if the military are not up to the task?

R J May, Stephanie Lawson, and Viberto Selochan, in an article written for the Australian National University comparing military rule to democracy, say this about popularly elected government, democracy and the constitution "This reflects the deeply embedded assumption of modern democratic theory, that it is the popularly elected government, and no other body or person, that is wholly responsible for deciding what policies are to be pursued in the name of the people. In so doing, the government is constrained by the limits to action set out under the law of the constitution, and is ultimately held accountable for its activities and decisions when it faces the judgement of the people at the polls."

R J May, Stephanie Lawson, and Viberto Selochan also say "But what if a constitutionally and popularly elected civilian government once in office abrogates the constitution and rejects the democratic values embodied in it (including genuinely competitive elections)? In such circumstances – which have been not uncommon in post-colonial states – the military may be the only entity within the country capable of reversing such a development and reinstating democratic government."

This cannot be allowed to happen in Egypt. The way to prevent it is to include language in the constitution that provides for separation of power among the branches of government, such that the legislature is the only body with the power to modify the constitution in any way. Furthermore, any modification to the constitution that the legislature proposes, must be approved by the provinces. This means that the legislature, elected by the people, may propose a change to the constitution; and the legislatures of the provinces must approve it. The constitution of a nation must be taken very seriously; any modifications to it should be subjected to rigorous review by the people before they are allowed to take effect.

Conclusion

For the military regime that has ruled Egypt since 1952 to survive and endure would be catastrophic for development in Egypt and with it the welfare and the chance for a dignified life and promising future. Civilian rule for Egypt is a must. It is the only option to prevent Egypt from falling into what generally ensues when the military assumes power after a revolution, a military dictatorship of the worst kind. One has only to ask: Is Egypt, 58 years, 9 months and 25 days basking in a military regime, better off today than before?

It is of the utmost importance that the Egyptian people should etch these random unattributed quotes in their collective mind:

"The military rules by force and not by the will of the people. Military rule does not have the good of the people as a priority. Civil rights, in fact basic human rights, are often nonexistent under military rule."
"Military governments look efficient, but they usually conceal terrible inefficiency and corruption behind the uniforms and medals."
"Military rule represents a failure to make civil rule work."
"Civil rule can look ineffectual, but it is actually a triumph of civilization to have an army reporting to an elected civilian assembly."

Egypt was once the flagship for the world entire. Now, if it would take a hundred years to get back to such a lofty status all effort, sweat and tears should not be spared, and the only route for Egypt to take is to make certain that its best and brightest, its most competent, skilled and talented sons and daughters rule the day in all facets of its life.

Hussein

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Military Regime and Developmen​t in Egypt

Military Regime and Development in Egypt